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Timestamp	Incident	Legal Relevance	Cross-
	Tow truck driver:	Violates Fourth Amendment seizure (Soldal v.	
	"When the NTA	Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 1992); Fourteenth	
0:01:04-	finds out about	Amendment due process (Mathews v. Eldridge,	Exhibit D
0:01:10	this, he will	424 U.S. 319, 1976; Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.	
	probably get his	527, 1981); NRS 205.2715 (unlawful taking or	
	license revoked."	operation); tortious interference.	
		Demonstrates First Amendment retaliation	
	Deputy Palamar: "I	(Fordyce v. Seattle, 55 F.3d 436, 9th Cir. 1995;	
	don't know if our,	Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S.	
0:01:20-	my bosses are	668, 1996; Nieves v. Bartlett, 139 S. Ct. 1715,	Exhibit C
0:01:25	going to have	2019); Fourteenth Amendment economic liberty	
	much appetite	(Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 1923); Monell	
	keeping a guy."	v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 1978); NRS	
		197.200 (oppression); defamation/trade libel.	

Legal Claims Supported

• First Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Retaliation for recording by targeting Plaintiff's towing rotation status (*Fordyce*, *Umbehr*, *Glik v. Cunniffe*, 655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011); *Irizarry v. Yehia*, 38 F.4th 1282 (10th Cir. 2022); *Nieves*; NRS 171.1233).

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- Fourth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Unlawful seizure of truck without warrant or exigency (Soldal).
- Fourteenth Amendment (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Procedural due process violation via tow and threats without notice (Mathews, Parratt); substantive due process via economic harm (Meyer, County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 1998).
- Municipal Liability (42 U.S.C. § 1983): Sheriff's policy/custom of retaliation implied by "my bosses" (0:01:20; *Monell*).
- State Law Claims: Unlawful taking or operation (NRS 205.2715), oppression under color of law (NRS 197.200), intentional interference with prospective economic advantage, defamation/trade libel (28 U.S.C. § 1367).

Summary Judgment Purpose (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56)

These undisputed facts—non-consensual tow (Exhibit D, 0:06:32.625), license revocation threat (0:01:04), rotation termination threat (0:01:20)—violate clearly established law (Fordyce, Soldal, Mathews). Linked to Plaintiff's recording (Exhibit C, 0:05:43-0:05:51), they demonstrate retaliatory intent and agency policy (Monell), establishing no genuine dispute of material fact and entitling Plaintiff to judgment as a matter of law.

Qualified Immunity Defeat

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Deputy Palamar's conduct contravenes clearly established rights under Pearson v. Callahan, 555 1 2 U.S. 223 (2009): 3 4 Violation: Recording retaliation (Fordyce, Glik, Irizarry, Nieves, Umbehr), seizure 5 (Soldal), due process (Mathews, Parratt). 6 Clearly Established: Rights were well-defined in 2022 (Fordyce 1995, Soldal 1992, 7 Umbehr 1996). 8 9 The tow (0:01:04) and threats (0:01:20) show objective unreasonableness (Kingsley v. 10 Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 2015), not negligence. "Safety" or "need" defenses fail against 11 Soldal's warrant requirement, Mathews's notice mandate, and Nieves's retaliation bar (Harlow v. 12 13 Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 1982). 14 15 16 Authentication 17 18 Per Fed. R. Evid. 901, I, Drew J. Ribar, declare under penalty of perjury this footage accurately 19 depicts Deputy Sean Palamar's tow arrangement and discussion on August 30, 2022. 20 21 **Dated: March 27, 2025** 22 /s/ Drew J. Ribar 23 24 Drew J. Ribar 25 3480 Pershing Ln, Washoe Valley, NV 89704 26 Tel: (775) 223-7899 27 Email: Const2Audit@gmail.com 28 PLEADING TITLE - 4